Margaret Teresa Lamberth v. Scott M. Lamberth : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Margaret Teresa Lamberth v. Scott M. Lamberth :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B Romney; Attorney General; Jack L Crellin; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondent.
Frank M Wells; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Margaret Teresa Lamberth v. Scott M. Lamberth, No. 14383.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/283
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
SEP 16 1976 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ^ H M N O Clark Uw SdlOol 
MARGARET TERESA LAMBERTH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-v-
SCOTT M. LAMBERTH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14383 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the judgment of the District Court 
of Weber County, Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde. 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Utah Attorney General 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Frank M. Wells 
550-24th Street, #304 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
\r I 
FEB 13 1876 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET TERESA LAMBERTH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-v-
SCOTT M. LAMBERTH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14383 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the judgment of the District Court 
of Weber County, Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde. 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Utah Attorney General 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Frank M. Wells 
550-24th Street, #304 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statement of Nature of Case 1 
Disposition of the Lower Court 1 
Relief Sought on Appeal ............... 1 
Statement of Facts 1 
Argument: 
Point I: 
THE ORDER OF SUPPORT OF THE LOWER COURT 
I S BASED UPON A PRE-DIVORCE "PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" CREATING A 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION COGNIZABLE UNDER 
THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
SUPPORT ACT 4 
Point II: 
THE SUBSEQUENT DIVORCE OF THE PARTIES 
DID NOT TERMINATE APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION 
TO THE RESPONDENT UNDER THE AGREEMENT 5 
Point III: 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT REQUIRES THIS STATE 
TO RECOGNIZE THE DIVORCE DECREE GRANTED 
TO THE PARTIES IN TEXAS 7 
Conclusion .. 9 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
Article 4, Section 1, United States Constitution 7 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 77-61a-2 (f), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended.... 4 
Section 77-61a-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 6 
CASES CITED 
Lyon v. Lyon, 115 U. 466, 206 P.2d 148 (1949) 5 
Campbell v. Campbell, 198 A. 414, 116 A.L.R. 939, 947 
(Md. C.A. 1938) 5 
Gunter v. Gunter, 334 A.2d 437 (Mass. App. 1975) 5 
Miller v. Miller, 463 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. C. A. 1971) 6 
Watton v. Watton, 173 P. 2d 867 (Calif. C. A. 1946) 6 
Intermountain Association of Credit Men v. Watterson, 
19 U.2d 212, 429 P.2d 818 (1967) 8 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §917 5 
42 C. J. S., Husband and Wife, §602 5 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET TERESA LAMBERTH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-v-
SCOTT M. LAMBERTH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14383 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for support under the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
From an order of support for the plaintiff-respondent, 
the defendant-appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the order of 
support. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this appeal the defendant-appellant makes many 
assertions of fact which are not supportable in the record 
on appeal, and therefore, should be ignored as totally self-
serving and spurious. The facts as shown in the record 
on appeal are as follows: 
The plaintiff-respondent is the former spouse of 
the defendant-appellant the parties having been married on 
or about December 13, 194 9 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and 
having been divorced in the State of Texas on or about 
August 16, 1973 (R.4, 25-29). Prior to their divorce, the 
parties, while residents of the State of Virginia, entered 
into a property settlement agreement which provided, inter 
alia, as follows: 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto wish to settle 
all matters relating to support and maintenance 
of WIFE, division of their property, and other 
related matters, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in adjustment and compromise of 
all property rights and other related matters, and 
in adjustment and compromise of all matters relating 
to maintenance, custody, and support and personal 
relationship, and in consideration of the mutual 
promises and covenants hereinafter set forth, the 
parties hereto do here mutually covenant and agree, 
grant and convey as follows: 
1. HUSBAND agrees to pay to WIFE during his 
lifetime, so long as the WIFE shall live and remain 
unremarried (but such obligation shall cease upon the 
occurrence of the first of any such events) the sum 
of Four thousand eight hundred dollars ($4,800.00) per 
annum payable in monthly installments of Four hundred 
dollars ($400.00) per month; provided, however, that 
such obligation of the HUSBAND shall be reduced by 
an amount equal to 20 per cent of the gross income 
of the wife per annum from salary, wages and bonuses 
from employment by the WIFE, if any. Such reduction 
shall be effected coincident with employment of the 
WIFE and further effected coincident with each increase 
in salary, wages, or bonuses received by the WIFE, 
which shall be pro-rated upon the basis of the 
applicable year, month, part of a year or part 
of a month. The WIFE shall promptly notify the 
HUSBAND of each employment and of each adjustment 
in salary, wages, or bonuses. On or before 
March 15 of each year, the WIFE shall deliver to 
the HUSBAND a statement which reflects the actual 
amount of gross salary, wages, and bonuses from 
employment during the prior calendar year and 
promptly thereafter the parties shall adjust any 
overpayment or underpayment made during the prior 
calendar year by the HUSBAND to the WIFE. (R. 26-27). 
The foregoing"property settlement agreement" was 
incorporated into the Texas divorce decree and was ordered to 
be made part of that judgment in accordance with the terms 
thereof. (R. 25-28). 
The plaintiff-respondent filed her petition for 
support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act in the Superior Court of the State of California for % 
the County of San Diego on January 20, 1975. (R. 4-8). The . 
matter was thereupon referred to the District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah, for enforcement. (R. 8-10). An order 
to show cause why the defendant-appellant should not be 
ordered and required to pay a reasonable amount per month for 
the support and maintenance of his former spouse was served 
upon the defendant (R. 11-13) and he filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted (R. 29). The motion to dismiss was denied on 
October 20, 1975 (R. 31), following which the defendant-appellant 
was ordered to pay the plaintiff-respondent the sum of $150.00 
per month for continuing support (R. 33-34). The defendant-
appellant appeals from this order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER OF SUPPORT OF THE LOWER COURT IS BASED 
UPON A PRE-DIVORCE "PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" 
CREATING A SUPPORT OBLIGATION COGNIZABLE UNDER 
THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT 
ACT. 
The "duty of support" contemplated in the Uniform 
Reciprocal of Support Act "includes any duty of support 
imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order, decree 
or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether 
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, 
separate maintenance or otherwise." Section 77-61a-2 (f) 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, underscoring supplied. 
Characterization of the agreement as a "property settlement 
agreement" has no effect on its content. It was clearly 
intended by the parties to provide for the support and 
maintenance of plaintiff-respondent. Apart from the expressed 
intent to provide for "support and maintenance", it was to 
endure for the life or until remarriage of plaintiff-respondent 
l 
and vary in sums due, according to the financial circumstances 
of the parties. As noted by the Supreme Court of Utah in 
another case involving a "property settlement agreement", 
i 
this agreement created an obligation "in the nature of alimony" 
and was really intended to supply "support and maintenance" 
to plaintiff-respondent. Lyon vs. Lyon, 115 U. 466, 
296 P.2d 148, 150. There being no challenge to the 
validity of such an agreement, the duty of defendant-
appellant to render support to plaintiff-respondent 
according to its terms is plainly "imposed or imposable 
by law" and thus cognizable under the Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act. 
POINT II 
THE SUBSEQUENT DIVORCE OF THE PARTIES DID 
NOT TERMINATE APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION TO 
THE RESPONDENT UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
As a general rule, provisions for spousal support 
in a separation agreement are not abrogated by a subsequent 
divorce, absent more. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 
§917; 42 C. J. S., Husband and Wife, §602; Campbell vs. 
Campbell, (Md. C.A. 1938) 198 A. 414, 116 A.L.R. 939, 947; 
Gunter vs. Gunter (Mass. App. 1975) 334 A.2d 437. In Texas, 
where the instant divorce was obtained, notwithstanding an 
anti-alimony public policy, the practice of incorporating 
"property settlement" agreements with built-in support provisions 
in divorce decrees has been countenanced. Shortly before the 
instant divorce was adjudged, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
ruled that an agreement remarkably similar to that here 
in issue which had been incorporated into a Texas decree 
of divorce was enforceable in an action at law, though 
perhaps not with aid of the contempt power because of 
Texas public policy. Miller vs. Miller, (C. A. Tex. 1971) 
463 S.W. 2d 477. 
Being mindful that plaintiff here is not seeking 
to enforce a Texas judgment but rather an obligation for 
support arising from the former relationship of the parties 
and a bona fide agreement between them, the law of Texas 
and the force of the Texas divorce decree are not decisive, 
if material at all. In this connection it should be noted 
that under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act the law 
of the State of residence of the obligor, i.e., Utah in this 
case, is applicable. Section 77-61a-7 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended. But, assuming arguendo that the law of 
Texas is material and was as represented by defendant, 
plaintiff, would nonetheless be entitled to be heard on her 
petition for support since, by his actions, defendant is 
estopped from denying the obligations undertaken in his 
"property settlement" agreement. Watton vs. Watton, Calif. 
C. A. 1946) 173 P.2d 867. Applying familiar rules of equity 
to a situation similar to the present case in which a foreign 
decree of divorce was claimed to cut off a former wifefs right 
to support under a separation agreement, the California 
Court of Appeals observed at Page 86 9 of 173 P.2d 
Reporter: 
"Defendant's agreement and the arrangement 
to have the terms of it carried into the decree 
no doubt furnished inducement to plaintiff to 
allow defendant to procure a divorce by default. 
Having obtained the decree, it would be most 
unfair and a legal fraud upon the plaintiff for 
defendant to retain the advantage of the decree 
and to escape his obligation by denying the 
jurisdiction of the court to award plaintiff 
support." 
POINT III 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT REQUIRES THIS STATE 
TO RECOGNIZE THE DIVORCE DECREE GRANTED TO 
THE PARTIES IN TEXAS. 
The defendant-appellant's only argument on appeal 
is that this court should declare a portion of the Texas 
divorce decree which he himself obtained as invalid upon 
the grounds that full faith and credit requires the property 
settlement agreement of the parties to be stricken therefrom 
under Texas law as enunciated in other cases. He misconceives 
the constitutional obligation of this court. The Utah Supreme 
Court is not enpowered to sit as an appellate court to 
overturn the judgment of a Texas District Court long after 
the defendant-appellant's right to appeal that judgment in 
the proper Texas forum has expired. 
Article 4, §1 of the United States Constitution 
provides that: 
"Full faith and credit shall be given in 
each state to the public acts, records and 
judicial proceedings of every other state." 
Even if this action were dependent upon the divorce decree 
of the Texas District Court, which it is not as hereinabove 
pointed out under Points I and II, the only "judicial 
proceedings" to which the Utah courts must extend full faith 
and credit in the instant case are those culminating in the 
divorce judgment of the District Court of San Patricio 
County, Texas incorporating the property settlement agreement 
between the parties hereto. Thus full faith and credit 
would require this court to sustain the judgment of the 
Texas District Court—not to overrule it. This case is 
not unlike Intermountain Association of Credit Men vs. 
Watterson, 19 U. 2d 212, 429 P. 2d 818 (1967), in which 
this court held as follows: ' .'\,\' y:/''^\. .;^/'}..'//[ :h 
"Idaho was the forum chosen by the assignors. 
Their assignee cannot change that forum, or the 
subject matter in order to seek a new forum and 
a different theory of action to serve its own 
ends. 
The assignee sued on an Idaho judgment. By 
conceding its invalidity, after it asserted its 
validity, it cannot now say I didn't mean what 
I said. After conceding the invalidity of the 
Idaho judgment, which it cannot do unless the 
Idaho courts agree, this court will recognize the 
Idaho judgment, and in our opinion, Intermountain 
best should go back to Idaho and pursue its remedies 
there. 
I 
...We prefer to respect the judgment of our sister 
state and not the stipulations of counsel who, having 
sought her jurisdiction, conveniently now are 
willing to attest to her illegitimacy." 
As stated in the foregoing case, this court should ' 
now respect the judgment of our sister state, Texas, and not 
the argument of a subsequently dissatisified litigant 
who, having sought her jurisdiction, is now conveniently 
willing to attest to her illegitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of support of the lower court is valid 
and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted: 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General for the State of 
Utah 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Attorney General for 
the State of Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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